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ARENAS AND STADIUMS

Do they make
economic sense?
by JOHN G. FOY, JR. / Partner, Detroit
Cities struggling to spur growth,
boost civic pride, and increase
revenue have turned to a variety of
capital projects —shopping malls,
arts centers, new government buildings, and, importantly, sports arenas.
The recent boom-bust cycle of
sports center development is an
excellent object lesson in this time of
governmental budget crunches. It
suggests the complexity of problems
to be addressed if expectations are to
be fulfilled.
In 1972, Denver voters turned down
legislation to finance the 1 9 7 6
Winter Olympics in their city; the
Games were moved to Innsbruck,
Still a topic of discussion is the
cost of capital construction for the
1 976 Summer O l y m p i c s
in
Montreal —not only in the economic
and political circles of that city, but
also in any other city mentioned as a
site for future Games.
After lengthy negotiations between the City of Los Angeles and
the International Olympic Committee, it appears that an agreement has
been reached that will protect Los
Angeles taxpayers in the event the
1984 Games in that city suffer a loss.
Despite the popularity, despite
the glamorous image of the sports
world, its colorful impresarios no
longer seem so able to persuade
A m e r i c a n t a x p a y e r s and l o c a l
officials to spend tax dollars for an
arena or stadium whose construc-

tion is against their better financial
judgment. An era of uninhibited
expansion in professional sports, of
new stadiums and arenas built with
civic pride and civic ambition appears to have wound down.
Whether or not to spend public
money to construct an arena or
stadium now prompts a vigorous
community discussion. What are the
precise benefits, what are the financial risks that go with building a
sports-related facility? T h e promoters must back up their enthusiasm with hard facts.
Some segments of the community, for example, argue that the

public should not provide tax dollars
so that privately o w n e d sports
teams, the primary tenants of these
arenas and stadiums, can make
money from a publicly financed
facility. Conversely, other segments
of the community argue that an
arena or stadium can mean additional business and improved morale
to a community. The situation is the
same, whether it concerns a relatively small 3,000-5,000 seat arena that
costs $2-$5 million in a city of
40,000-50,000, or a large $100-$200
million stadium with 60,000-80,000
seats in a large metropolitan area.
A common problem for public
arenas or stadiums built in the past
ten years is that the facility operates
in the red if debt service —the cost
of the initial borrowing for construction—is included. When facilities
claim they are operating in the black,
what many of them really mean is
that they are covering operating
costs. Excluding debt service is often
considered acceptable, however,
since so many facilities do not even
cover operating costs. When older
stadiums and arenas actually do
operate in the black, it is usually
because their original construction
cost was much lower. In the early
1960s, a large stadium's cost was in
the range of $30 million to $50
million. A comparable stadium today
ranges from $80 million to $150
million.
So w h y do communities across
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The Silver dome, Pontiac, Michigan.
the country still debate whether or
not to build arenas or stadiums?
Probably the most common reason
is the hope that the facility will bring
more people and, therefore, more
money into the community. In the
case of larger cities, this can be
money and people drawn back into
the inner city. It is usually hard to
prove, however, that an arena or
stadium by itself can cause a community to be revitalized. Normally,
several projects are needed. A more
prevailing reason a stadium or arena
gains support is focused on the pride
of the community, as it is reflected in
the support and allegiance to a
professional sports team. Regardless
of the reason, however, it is ultimately the community, through a referendum or through a decision of elected
officials, that should decide whether
the benefits, economic and otherwise, of a new stadium are worth the
cost.
Detroit: Two Game Plans
Perhaps the easiest way to understand the complex factors involved
in borrowing money for an arena or
60

stadium is to take a look at the
experiences of two communities in
the Detroit metropolitan area.
First, there is the $55 million,
80,000-seat Pontiac Silverdome. Pontiac is a suburban city of 90,000
about 30 miles from downtown
Detroit. The Pontiac Silverdome was
constructed in 1973 to be the home
of the National Football League's
Detroit Lions, plus a site of other
s p e c i a l e v e n t s and c o m m u n i t y
activities. The stadium was financed
by $25 million in revenue bonds,
$16 million in general obligation
bonds passed by citizens in a special
referendum, and $7 million in shortterm borrowings.
Recently, the Pontiac Silverdome
received unfavorable publicity —precipitated by losses of $3.2 million,
after debt service, in the first three
years of operation. Further, it is
projected that the stadium will lose
an additional $2.5 million in the
1977-1978 fiscal year, in addition to
being considerably more than the
planned deficit of $1.8 million over
these four years, this deficit of $5,7
million, an obligation of the city, is

very large when compared to the
entire annual budget for Pontiac,
which is only $25 million.
An analysis of the deficit reveals
that some of the largest expenditures during the first three years
were for improvements that helped
to bring to Pontiac two additional
sports teams —the National Basketball Association's Detroit Pistons and
a newly-formed soccer team, the
Detroit Express. To accommodate
the Pistons, for example, a smaller
" m i n i - d o m e " of a p p r o x i m a t e l y
36,000 seats was created. The design of this mini-dome utilizes a
corner of the stadium, with permanent seating accounting for two of
the four sides and temporary seating
completing the remaining two sides.
The mini-dome, which is separated
from the remainder of the stadium
by a removable curtain, will also be
used to accommodate events with
smaller attendance.
Critics might ask, however, "Isn't
this throwing good money after bad,
since the city had apparently planned on losing money on the primary
tenant, the Lions, and now it may
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continue to run deficits with additional professional sports teams?" In
response, two factors should be
considered. First, most of the deficit
in the first three years is the result of
"one-time" expenses; the stadium
does anticipate breaking even in the
near future.
<
Second, and perhaps more important, since its opening in September
of 1975, until the end of the fiscal
year, June 30, 1978, the Pontiac
Silverdome has been visited by
nearly 4 million paying customers. It
has been estimated that these have
generated close to $32 million in
direct income for businesses and
residents in the metropolitan Pontiac
area. When considering a 21/2times
respending (multiplier) effect for this
$32 million (i.e., assume a local
restaurant is the recipient of one of
these dollars and would in turn pay
an employee who would in turn go
to the local store or gas station and
spend the money), the total economic benefit to the Pontiac area is
approximately $70 million.

directions. Therefore, the stadium
appeared to be a good option.
Another factor that influenced the
stadium decision was the pride of
city residents. At that particular time,
the city of Pontiac was receiving
national attention because of problems associated with the busing of
school children as a result of a
Supreme Court decision. This issue
had divided the citizens of Pontiac,
and uniting behind the stadium
project thus restored some of the
pride that had been lost through the
busing problem.
The second example is that of the
city of Detroit and its efforts in the
stadium/arena area. The city is
attempting to improve its image and
its pride. The new Renaissance Center in downtown Detroit reflects this.
With three of its professional sports
teams already moved to Pontiac,

Detroit w a s faced with t h e
possibility of losing its remaining
professional baseball and hockey
teams.
To keep the Detroit Tigers, the city
bought the existing baseball stadium
for one dollar and began a multiyear, $30 million renovation. At the
same time, the Detroit Red Wings of
the National Hockey League were
c o n t e m p l a t i n g a move to t h e
suburbs and building their own
arena. To counteract this, the city
decided to construct a $25 million
arena, and to offer a highly favorable
financial package to the management of the Red Wings. This proposal, indeed, prompted their decision to stay in Detroit.
What effect will all of this have on
downtown Detroit? It is probably
safe to say that it can contribute to
the renaissance of the city and,

The Superdome, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Another question that might be
asked is whether or not the stadium
money could have been spent on
something else that would have had
a better economic effect on the city.
In the case of Pontiac, a study done
at the same time the stadium was
being comtemplated indicated that
the growth from other revenueattracting industries —shopping centers, office complexes, and multiple
family dwellings—was limited in
Pontiac due to an abundance of
such industries in the surrounding
communities. The study concluded
that economic expansion was available to the city only through additional manufacturing facilities. But it
was felt by the community that
Pontiac had enough manufacturing,
that it would rather expand in other
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coupled with other developments,
can improve t h e e c o n o m y a n d
morale of the citizens. This, in turn,
might help promote a movement
back toward downtown Detroit. But
there are too many imponderables,
beginning with a winning record for
the Tigers and Red Wings, to enable
one to predict the city's future with
certainty.
An example of a city which
refused to support an arena is
Columbus, Ohio, where a 20,000seat, $29.5 million arena was proposed. In this case, a feasibility study
indicated that total revenues would
not cover operating expenses. The
shortfall would have resulted in a
cost to the average Columbus citizen of approximately $1.50 per year,
before considering any debt service.
Asked to vote in a referendum, the
citizens of Columbus rejected the
building, at least for the time being.
Presumably they wished to spend
their money on something other
than an arena.
A Case Study in Optimism
When a community does decide to
build an arena or stadium, there are
many pitfalls to be avoided. Too
often a community decides that
building a stadium will be good for
the community, then constructs the
facility without properly analyzing
the facts. Often the supporters of
the facility are so caught up in their
own enthusiasm that they project
potential events and revenue far
greater than reality would indicate.
Exactly this took place recently in
a metropolitan area of approximately
350,000 persons, whose major industry is tourism. The details are
interesting. The city has two contrasting areas. T h e newer section is
viable and growing. T h e original
downtown section, however, has
62
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been in need of economic expansion.
In the past, several special interest
groups for the overall community
have suggested building a sports
arena. Most recently a downtown
businessmen's association commissioned several feasibility studies;
they determined that an 18,000-seat
arena was needed and that, furthermore, it should be located in the
downtown area. Yet despite extensive campaigning for a new arena,
there was little or no support for it in
the local government. Therefore, the
businessmen lobbied at the state
legislature and succeeded in having a
law passed that mandated construction of a sports arena adjacent to the
central business district. It would be
funded from hotel tax revenues
previously earmarked for operating a
convention center and promoting
tourism. The cost of the arena was
estimated at $26 million.
Inside the visitors convention bureau commission, there w a s a
spirited debate, 5hould the commission reject the state law or comply
with it? Several feasibility studies
existed, but the commissioners decided that prior to committing their
organization to a heavy financial
burden, they would retain an inde-

pendent third party to prepare a new
feasibility study. The study would
determine not only the financial and
marketing feasibility of the project,
but also a specific site for the arena.
The decision for a new study was
not welcomed, incidentally, by the
special interest group that had lobbied for the law. Here is the story of
that study.
First, a profile of the general
market area was compared to those
of other areas of the country. The
results were not encouraging. For
example, this metropolitan area of
350,000 persons was not in the top
100 population centers in the nation.
Moreover, 18,000-seat arenas were
normally built in major metropolitan
areas of at least 2 million people.
Typical arenas of that size also had at
least one, and often two, major
professional sports teams, as well as
a schedule of more than 200 events
annually. In addition, most of these
arenas lost money if debt service
was included in total cost of the
arena.
Metropolitan areas of comparable
size to this tourist community had
arenas of approximately 8,00012,000 seats, and none of them
served as the home of a professional
sports team. Furthermore, only one

franchise in the National Basketball
Association, the National Hockey
League, or the World Hockey Association was in a city of less than one
million in population. And that city,
San Antonio, Texas, has a population
of almost one million people and
ranks as the 37th largest population
center in the country.
Based on a thorough analysis of
area demographics, it was determined that a sports arena in this
tourist community could attract 100
to 110 events. To illustrate the
optimism that is sometimes exhibited when advocating construc-

tion of a stadium, we can compare
this projection to that of a previous
study conducted by the special
interest group. The result is as
follows:
• A projection of 16 intercollegiate basketball games was more
realistic than the previous study's
21 games. Conversations with the
league in which the local university
team played indicated that the maximum number of home games allowed (league and non-league) was
17. The special interest group had
predicted more games than were
permissible under league rules.

• No hockey games were projected for this market. The special
interest group had projected 41 such
events. According to hockey league
officials in that region of the country,
there were no teams interested in
moving to this marketplace, and,
furthermore, there were no people in
this particular metropolitan area that
had either expressed an interest or
had contacted a league to sponsor a
team. Furthermore, this area had had
two professional hockey teams previously, and both had gone bankrupt
due to lack of interest.
• No volleyball games were pro-

Mile High Stadium, Denver, Colorado.
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jected. The special interest group
had projected 22 professional volleyball games. Further investigation into
this projection indicated nothing
more than talk about forming a
professional league for cities of this
size, and no communities had been
identified.
• The special interest study also
indicated 12 intercollegiate sports
activities to be held in the proposed
arena. Interviews with the coaches
of the various teams from the local
university indicated that there was
no interest or desire to move their
games off the campus and into a
large arena,
• The special interest group predicted that there would be $125,000
in daytime or non-event parking. But
an investigation of the proposed site
for the downtown arena revealed
that there were no commercial or
retail establishments adjacent to the
property. Furthermore, there was free
or inexpensive street and off-street
parking available closer to the downtown area.
To determine the operating expenses for a facility, one analyzes
similar facilities in other localities
and then adjusts the analysis according to what is planned for the
specific project. Since existing convention personnel were to operate
the new arena, accurate operating
costs could be estimated. These
projections indicated personnel
costs would be approximately twice
what the special interest group had
estimated. The special interest group
study also projected fringe benefits
to be an additional 12 percent of
payroll costs, whereas the actual
financial statements for the existing
convention center indicated that a
rate of 26 percent was more accurate. From this analysis of operating
costs, expenses were projected to
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be approximately $500,000 higher
annually than the special interest
group had foreseen.
This analysis projected an operating loss before debt services of
$350,000, vs. the special interest
group projection of a $1,4 million
profit.
In addition to the operating loss,
the debt service had to be added to
determine the project's total cost to
citizens. Utilizing somewhat different
construction costs, but the same
debt service assumptions used in
the former study, the project was
forecast to lose approximately $2
million per year This compared to
the previous study's projection of a
$700,000 annual loss.
In response, the special interest
group hired another consultant to
refute the new study's statistics and
projections. This consultant stated
that projections of only 100 to 110
events were unreasonable. He based
his o w n p r o j e c t i o n s o n t h e
Philadelphia Spectrum, the Los Angeles Forum, and the Washington,
D.C. Capitol Centre, all of which
were holding 250 to 300 events
annually. Such a comparison was not
valid, however, since these arenas
serve metropolitan areas of approximately 3 to 7 million people, not an
area of 350,000. In addition, each of
the three facilities above housed two
professional sports teams, thereby
providing about 80 to 85 of the total
events.
Although it may appear that the
special interest group was purposely
using incorrect figures, this was not
the case. They really did believe
their numbers, largely due to their
enthusiasm for the project. What of
the commission? After considering
the facts, the commission accepted
its own study and tabled consideration of the facility until a new

source of funds could be identified
to support the $2 million annual
deficit.
Post-Came Follow-Up
During the past ten years, the
question of whether public money
should be spent to construct an
arena or stadium has been raised
again and again. If there is a trend
today, it is that communities are less
willing to run a financial risk on
sports-related facilities. They will
support only projects for which a
need is obvious.
Thus, when a study is conducted
to determine whether or not an
arena or stadium makes sense to a
community, care must be taken that
all economic factors are realistically
evaluated. The community or its
elected representatives c a n then
make the decision. Should a decision
be made to build a facility, both the
financing and the construction must
be carefully monitored, the initial
operation carefully planned, and,
when in operation, the arena or
stadium must be run as is any private
business.
" W e have to meet payrolls, as
does any other business," says Abe
Pollin, w h o owns and operates the
Capitol Centre in Washington, D.C.,
at a net profit. "We have to pay
taxes, as any other business. W e
have to pay rent. We have to meet all
our bills. W e can't look to the
taxpayer to bail us out. The fact is
that public stadiums and centers are
not run with the same intensity, the
same acumen as they are when you
have to make a financial go of it."
But this is a challenge that communities w h o plan, build, and operate stadiums c a n meet—if they
obtain the correct information beforehand and then implement their
plan faithfully.
a

